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 Foreword
This is the report of a hearing that took place on 27 November, 2015, at the LSE. 
Participants were invited for their expertise on financial regulation and European 
integration, not for any particular views they hold about Britain’s relationship to  
the European Union.1 
We are extremely grateful for the constructive debate in which the participants  
of the hearing engaged as well as for the feedback we received on a first draft.  
These contributions were given on a personal basis and should not be attributed to  
the respective organisations. The report also benefited greatly from background 
information generously provided by Professor Niamh Moloney from the LSE Law 
department before and after the hearing. Marion Osborne provided excellent 
organisational support. David Spence helped us greatly with the final drafting.  
Any remaining errors are our responsibility.
London, 11 December 2015
1 See the list in the Appendix.
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1. Introduction
The topic of this hearing was the EU’s regulation of financial services and the  
relationship between outsiders and insiders of the monetary union. The hearing was 
therefore concerned with two crucial determinants of economic benefits and costs  
from membership.
EU financial regulation has moved up the political agenda due to the North-Atlantic 
financial crisis since 2007-08 in the wake of which a Single Rulebook was introduced  
for all EU member states. The euro area crisis since 2010 gave this a further boost with  
the Banking Union that has split the Single Market into euro-insiders and euro-outsiders. 
The ECB got supervisory powers for all banks in the euro area, which makes it, in  
terms of assets, the authority with the largest prudential responsibility in the world.  
The relationship with the Banking Union is of vital importance to the City which  
happens to be the financial centre of a currency union to which it does not belong.
The hearing made clear that nobody expects there to be a major immediate disruption 
in case of an exit from the EU. The UK financial sector has strengths as a global financial 
centre and its financial services have a great variety that do not all depend on banking 
with mainland Europe. But there was also a consensus that the City in particular would 
lose business and employment over the medium to long term. The EU would have no 
incentive to give UK financial institutions and their regulation a status that would  
facilitate trade. On the contrary, agreements to assist euro-denominated business in  
the UK through central bank cooperation could be revisited if the UK would cease to  
be a member state of the union.
More important is, especially in light of the experience of a North Atlantic financial crisis, 
to consider what the UK taxpayer would lose from a Brexit. Participants agreed that 
past UK governments were very apt in seeking the EU legislation and regulation they 
wanted for domestic purposes. This was not necessarily, as one participant forcefully put 
it, protection of the City from Europe but protection of the UK taxpayer from the City, 
using Europe. The hearing discussed at lengths the threats to economic stability and fiscal 
sustainability that an oversized financial system poses to any nation state. It would leave 
the UK taxpayer more exposed to the costs of financial instability.
The report has the following structure: the section after the summary discusses the 
crucial questions if Britain were to stay in the EU. Does its financial sector need different 
regulation than the rest of the EU? And how problematic is its status as an outsider of the 
European monetary union? The following section discusses the eventuality of a Brexit. 
How would this affect liquidity provision in the case of another crisis? And how would its 
access to the EU financial markets change? The conclusions note points of disagreement 
and consensus among the experts at the hearing.
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2.   Summary
•  All participants expected job losses 
for UK banking but nobody expected 
the UK to lose its status as a financial 
centre. Banking is vulnerable to losing 
its role as a gateway into the euro 
area, while other financial and business 
services would remain competitive. 
•  The extent of job losses would largely 
depend on the equivalence of British 
regulations to EU regulations. This 
points to a Norwegian solution in which 
the UK would either keep or adopt the 
core of EU financial regulation even 
though it is outside the Union. 
•  Keeping most of the existing EU 
regulations was not seen as a major 
drawback for the UK and its financial 
services, including insurance, because 
the UK had been influential in shaping 
these regulations. Exceptions, in 
which the UK was overridden by an 
EU majority, concern the regulation of 
hedge funds and bankers’ bonuses.
•  The rather limited outcome of the 
February 2016 re-negotiation of the 
UK of an emergency break for euro 
–outsiders was in line with what the 
participants in this hearing expected.
This reform allows euro-outsiders to 
throw sand in the wheels of euro area 
legislation, but not stop it entirely. 
•  An explanation is the UK’s own 
ambivalent position vis-à-vis further 
integration of the euro area. Chancellor 
Osborne conceded a “remorseless 
logic” of further integration required 
to stabilise the euro area but the 
government also fears being left 
outside the room where agreements  
are prepared. 
•  Assets and liabilities of UK-resident 
banks are largely denominated in 
currencies other than the British Pound, 
hence a liquidity crisis will typically 
require swap arrangements with other 
major central banks.
•  Central bank cooperation is likely to 
continue, because it has a long  
tradition predating the euro and is 
of vital mutual interest. The size of 
financial institutions and the length  
of emergency support required  
would make this imperative for the 
Bank of England and the European 
Central Bank. 
•  This continued cooperation would 
not stop the European Central Bank 
pressing for euro-denominated business 
to move to a member state of the 
Eurozone, bringing it under the ECB’s 
jurisdiction as a prudential authority 
and lender of last resort. 
 
Waltraud Schelkle, 18 May 2016
4 |   Financial regulation and the protection of Eurozone outs
The initial discussion revolved around the 
question how different the UK financial 
system is compared to those in Continental 
Europe. There was consensus that it is 
different, but whether this makes the UK 
financial system unique and in need of 
separate regulation or safeguards was 
much debated. There was also agreement 
that the integration dynamic of the EU, 
namely predictably stronger financial 
integration of the Eurozone, affects the 
UK financial sector. Yet while agreeing that 
the UK has a fundamental interest in the 
stabilization of the Eurozone, participants 
discussed at length whether it necessarily 
follows that the UK is, or seeks to be, an 
obstacle to the process.
3.1 Differences in size, structure 
and connectedness
Participants remarked on several features 
making the financial system in the 
UK possibly so distinctive as to create 
predictably different UK interests in EU 
financial regulation. Did the sheer size of 
the UK financial system make for relevant 
difference? Angus Armstrong suggested 
that size, complexity and number of UK 
systemically important financial institutions 
create a potential exposure for the British 
taxpayer that may become too large to 
underwrite. This requires a Bank of England 
which can act as an almost ‘infinite’ lender 
of last resort to manage this tail risk – 
which the Bank can do as long as Pound 
Sterling liquidity is required, as in particular 
Graham Bishop remarked. This raises the 
question of central bank cooperation, for 
3.   How different are the interests of the  
UK in financial regulation? 
Graph 1: External business of MFI operating in the UK by currency, 9/2015
   
Source: Bank of England (2015a,Table C3.3); outstanding amounts, expressed in  
US-$ as of Q2 of 2015, are rounded
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instance in emergency liquidity access for 
systemically important banks and central 
counterparties (CCPs) as well as cross-
border resolution of banks. The following 
graph indicates that banks (“Monetary 
Financial Institutions”, MFI) operating in 
the UK have more claims and liabilities in 
other currencies than in Pound Sterling. 
In particular Sharon Bowles and Nicolas 
Véron disputed that the UK was in a 
unique position in this regard. Though 
to different degrees other financial 
centres such as Luxembourg also have 
large institutions, which are active across 
borders, and this raises the question of 
responsibilities if liquidity and solvency 
issues arise2. 
Simon Gleeson did not think that UK 
finance was so different (“finance is 
finance”), yet with one exception. He 
argued that the global rather than 
national character of the UK financial 
centre gives it a particularly intense 
interest in permissive third country 
regimes.  These regimes set out the 
legally binding conditions under which 
financial businesses from outside the EU 
(“third countries”) endeavour to sell their 
products in EU markets. The countries in 
which they are headquartered must have 
laws and supervision in place equivalent to 
EU provisions. Access to one member state 
acts as a “passport” and allows selling in 
all EU financial markets. If countries, such 
as China, do not have such equivalent 
provisions, their banks or insurers will 
have to establish subsidiaries at high cost. 
The UK would prefer such third country 
regimes to be based on broad principles, 
while the European Commission and 
the ECB seem to prefer “line-by-line” 
equivalence. Nicolas Véron again doubted 
this was a UK-specific concern. Rather, 
third country treatment is a European 
problem arising mainly through the UK 
insofar as the UK acts as a gateway to the 
EU for financial businesses from China 
and elsewhere. But if it were not for the 
UK, the EU would still have the problem 
of ensuring foreign businesses conform to 
equivalent standards of proper conduct 
and prudential supervision etc. 
A Bank of England (BoE) report on “EU 
membership and the Bank of England” 
from October 2015 highlights how 
large, different and connected the UK 
financial system is and to what extent it is 
connected to the EU. Data is from 2013-14; 
all values have been converted to Pound 
Sterling at historical exchange rates.
•  The UK is the EU’s largest financial 
centre with 24% of market share (gross 
value added); Germany comes next with 
16%. Financial services contribute about 
8% to income and just under 4% of 
employment. The EU itself has the second 
largest financial services sector in the 
world, with about £550 b value added, 
after the United States with £736 b.
2  See more on swaplines and CCPs below.
3  Examples for US-UK differences cited by Rosa Lastra were insurance regulation, stress tests, macro prudential instruments 
and ring fencing of commercial banking. The exception of a US-UK consensus was, in her view, bank resolution after the 
Lehman default.
The characteristics that  
make the UK financial  
system different do not 
necessarily make it require 
different regulation.
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•  The UK is the largest exporter of 
financial services in the EU, with 40% 
market share, while the EU as a whole 
accounts for about half of all financial 
services exports in the world. 
•  The UK is the leading global market 
for cross-border banking, derivatives 
trading and insurance services. In turn, 
two thirds of all cross-border investment 
involves the EU (65% each of all 
cross-border banking and portfolio 
investment; 75% of all foreign direct 
investment). Other EU countries are, as 
a group, the largest investment partners 
of the UK and account for about 40% 
of all UK cross-border investment.   
It seems fair to conclude that the UK 
financial centre, in particular the City, is 
as much global as it is European. Karel 
Lannoo remarked that from a historical 
perspective, “this financial centre has 
grown with the single market”; chart 1.4 
in the BoE report lends some support to 
his conjecture of a “direct correlation”. 
This would suggest that the characteristics 
that make the financial system different 
do not necessarily make it require 
different regulation. Sharon Bowles 
supported this very strongly for the 
massive reregulation exercise in recent 
years, for example in terms of flexibility 
on capital requirements and the mother 
of all directives: “due to the volume of 
knowledge and information available 
from the UK [MiFID II ] was crafted around 
many UK wishes such as open access.”  
A similar point was made by Mark 
Nicholson for insurance and the Solvency 
II Directive: for “insurance companies 
regulated previously in the UK, there 
was perhaps less change than for other 
European insurers”.
3.2 Outsider status and the 
dynamic of Eurozone integration
If the specific needs of the UK’s financial 
system do not warrant a major effort 
of renegotiation, does the dynamic of 
Eurozone integration suggest that the 
UK government should seize the moment 
and ask for safeguards? This view was 
expressed by Raoul Ruparel, who referred 
to “the Greek bridge loan as a watershed 
moment of potential caucusing from the 
Eurozone against the non-euro countries.” 
The solution of opting in on a bilateral 
basis “relied on Eurozone countries fighting 
the UK’s case for them and the good-will 
of the Eurozone”, which Ruparel believed 
was not “a sustainable model going 
forward.” He was concerned about the 
institutions founded to rescue the euro area 
being introduced with a “Single Market 
justification“, banking union in general and 
the recently proposed European deposit 
guarantee scheme in particular. He argued 
safeguards were necessary for Eurozone-
outsiders against negative effects resulting 
from intensified integration of the currency 
union. This was seconded by Lukas Marek. 
He argued that new member states, 
such as the Czech Republic, were treaty-
obliged to commit to seeking membership 
of monetary union, yet this union was a 
moving target and no longer the same as 
when the commitment was made. 
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Sharon Bowles granted that there are 
“tensions between financial stability 
and the single market” in prudential 
regulation. “For the sake of both the  
single market and raising standards,  
the EU has moved from directives to 
maximum harmonising regulations.”  
This creates a “dilemma” for member 
states like the UK that prefer to go 
beyond that maximum, for instance 
setting higher capital requirements in  
the interest of financial stability (and 
possibly competitive advantage). In this 
particular example, the relevant Directive 
(CRD4) allowed a member state to  
add up to 3% to the capital buffer.  
This “constrained flexibility” was 
also exercised in other areas, such as 
macroprudential measures, by setting 
limits to national discretion. 
Her interpretation of PM Cameron’s letter 
to Council President Donald Tusk (Cameron 
2015) is that he wants “protections for 
the City, which isn’t actually protection 
of the City from Europe. It is protection 
of the tax-payers from the City. Do 
European regulations, being too 
inflexible, prevent that?” She saw this as 
the substance of what the government 
wants to negotiate in this area, and also 
interpreted recent speeches by Mark 
Carney (2015) in this light. But there is 
another side to the dilemma: “The concern 
that the Commission voices is that having 
additional capital – or other standards - in 
some countries but not others fragments 
the single market and can be used in 
protectionist ways.”
This point led to a discussion about the 
“choice” the UK had made with respect to 
banking union. Nicolas Véron insisted that 
the banking union was a project of both 
the single market and the Eurozone.  
He referred to a speech by Danièle Nouy 
on 24 November 2015, in which the head 
of the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
argued that the banking union had been 
a long time coming and the financial crisis 
acted merely as a decisive catalyst for it 
(Nouy 2015). For instance, the Lamfalussy 
legislative process had prepared the ground 
for a Single Rulebook and European 
Supervisory Authorities had also been 
created already. In this light, the UK’s 
decision to stay out of the banking union 
was therefore choosing the outsider 
position rather than having it imposed by 
the Eurozone: “By adopting the stance that 
there is a remorseless logic to Eurozone 
integration in 2011, the UK government  
has made the choice of favouring a  
two-tier system for the Single Market.”  
The UK government played an active role in 
bringing this about and was “generous” in 
the sense that the administration “extracted 
a very small price for its assent to the SSM 
[Single Supervisory Mechanism] regulation”. 
This generosity reflected enlightened 
self-interest. Chancellor Osborne wanted 
the Eurozone to fix its problems in order 
to avert negative effects on the British 
economy. Whether chosen or imposed, the 
two-tier banking union has settled in now.
Both John Springford and Simon Gleeson 
considered the quest for safeguards in 
detail and saw the UK in a paradoxically 
weak negotiation position. The UK’s status 
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as a global financial centre is so linked to 
its being the gateway to the EU, while also 
being a financial centre for the EU, that 
experts realise that Brexit would hurt the 
City significantly. Hence, neither saw much 
chance for the various options being floated. 
John Springford went through the list:
•  There cannot be a veto about future 
rules without completely disrupting 
European integration. 
•  The double majority voting as practiced 
in the European Banking Authority is 
also unlikely to be transferred to other 
institutions, because it would give a 
minority of outsiders a de facto veto 
over the majority of insiders. 
•  Reducing the extent of Qualified 
Majority Voting when a member state’s 
significant interest is concerned, as  
both Raoul Ruparel and James Sproule 
had advocated, is excluded as well as 
risking to undermine the functioning  
of the EU.
•  An emergency brake procedure that 
could be pulled if enough Eurozone-
outs said that a particular piece of 
proposed legislation was going to 
damage them would just mean a  
pause but those affected could not 
simply get rid of such legislation.
Simon Gleeson took the example of bonus 
rules to explain why all these safeguards 
are unlikely to work. The rule that says 
fixed pay has to be 50% of total pay is 
regarded in the UK as “a major damage to 
manage its financial centre”. But in order 
to counter this, the UK government would 
have had to stop the entire legislative 
package (CRD IV) of which the bonus rules 
were only a very small element. “You are 
very much in favour of 98% of what’s in 
the CRD but the idea that you are going 
to get a line-by-line veto that allows you 
to apply an emergency brake to individual 
articles or sub-articles of the Directive does 
seem highly implausible.”
This led Sharon Bowles to emphasize 
how important it is “to be in the room” 
when new projects are started and 
legislation crafted. The Capital Markets 
Union was a case in point. It was of 
great interest to the UK because the City 
has a disproportionately large stake in 
capital market finance, even compared to 
banking. Being in the room also seemed 
important to her in order to prevent early 
on any steps that are separating insiders 
from outsiders. Her example was the Five 
Presidents report (Juncker et al 2015) 
which she saw as “a little bit insensitive 
towards euro-outs and there is perhaps a 
hint that they are trying to say that there 
is a special single market in the Eurozone 
that is different than the one outside.” 
If one is never in the room, she argued, 
it does not require conscious caucusing 
of the Eurozone-ins to come up with 
insensitive projects. She drew the analogy 
of the glass ceiling that professional 
In financial regulation, the 
UK prefers to go beyond 
the maximum set by EU 
harmonization.
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women face and their male colleagues  
find hard to see.  
James Sproule had the most radical idea 
on how to ensure the UK would be in the 
room: “In the US, we have the Federal 
Reserve System of many different federal 
reserve members on the board. It is 
interesting: the New York Fed is always  
on the board and the others all rotate.  
And given the weight of interests of the 
UK in this, maybe there is a case for taking 
a lesson from it and saying ‘Look, because 
of the UK’s predominant interest in this 
we always are in the sub-committee on it, 
whereas the others shift.’ There is just a 
disproportional interest.”
Raoul Ruparel expressed scepticism as 
regards this substitution for safeguards:  
“if we are not in the euro there are going 
to be rooms that we are not going to be 
in. You can say that the UK decided not to 
be in the banking union, but was the UK 
ever going to be part of a banking union 
that was under the guise of the ECB?  
You have the ECB Governing Council 
having the final decision: can the UK 
ever join that?” He did not think so: “It 
would be a big transfer of power. You can 
complain about that but the reality is that 
there are going to be rooms we are not 
[..] in, so we have to work towards finding 
safeguards that are reasonable and work 
for a number of different countries.”
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What would Brexit mean? 
The answers to this question covered the 
whole spectrum. James Sproule thought 
“Brexit could be a success” and Small 
and Medium Enterprises were not fearful 
of a “vindictive” EU but expected a 
“pragmatic” reaction – an optimism he did 
not entirely share, however. Others were 
less concerned. One participant inferred 
from Harold James’ (2012) history of 
European monetary integration that the 
euro “emerged out of the habit of central 
bank cooperation” and was “very reluctant 
to believe that if we were to leave, that 
habit would be relinquished”. By contrast, 
Karel Lannoo and Graham Bishop expected 
“free provision of services [to be] finished” 
and cooperation between central banks 
seriously impaired. Rosa Lastra made the 
more political point (in a submission before 
the hearing) that “there’s a real danger 
London as an international financial centre 
will lose its shine outside the EU”.  
Contrary to a common perception, she 
did not find U.S. and UK regulators seeing 
eye to eye on many issues3, hence the UK 
could not simply side with the U.S. and 
work through international fora like the 
Financial Stability Board. The following 
gives a succinct account of somewhat 
technical issues that should be all part of  
a wider debate.
4.1 Central bank cooperation 
The panel discussed central bank 
cooperation at length, following the size-
argument Angus Armstrong had begun. 
As shown in graph 1 above, UK banks 
have assets and liabilities of over $4.5 
trn each that are 85-90% denominated 
in other currencies than Pound Sterling. 
Graham Bishop outlined the scenario in 
which a UK bank or central counterparty 
(CCPs) with major Euro liabilities gets into 
a squeeze: the Bank of England would 
have to go to the ECB saying “we have 
this problem, let us have €5-10 billion over 
night, please.” This would be quite a large 
sum for the ECB, given its paid-in capital 
of €10.5 b. In the event of a loss, the ECB 
would have to go back to its members, the 
national central banks in the Eurosystem, 
and some of the members would have 
to ask for their government’s approval 
to send more money. “You very quickly 
get into a situation where resolving a 
liquidity problem in the City, however it 
has arisen (we should think about CCPs as 
an obvious one), the ECB is the provider 
of the money. There is no way the UK can 
provide it.” In this scenario, namely that 
“the lender of last resort to a substantial 
chunk of the City’s activities is going to be 
a foreign central bank over which we have 
no control”, customers might say: ‘actually 
if I want to be sure about the lender of last 
resort kicking in in the moment of crisis, I 
think I would rather deal with somebody 
who is under the direct supervision of the 
people who print the money.’ So there is a 
big issue, which is highly technical; but in 
the end this is real practical power politics.”
David Lascelles objected: it was 
inconceivable that the ECB would simply 
refuse to provide a swap line to the Bank 
of England if there were a major crisis 
brewing on its doorstep. “Surely we have 
3  Examples for US-UK differences cited by Rosa Lastra were insurance regulation, stress tests, macro prudential 
instruments and ring fencing of commercial banking. The exception of a US-UK consensus was, in her view,  
bank resolution after the Lehman default.
4.   What would Brexit mean?  
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had many crises in the past where we 
have not only drawn on continental bank 
liquidity but on North American bank 
liquidity.” This objection was seconded 
by Sharon Bowles, who argued that the 
dependence was mutual: the ECB was 
not “really interested in swap lines with 
sterling until they discovered the exposure 
of Ireland to Sterling, which is when things 
got a bit more evened out.” The ECB had 
benefitted from swap lines with the Fed, 
the latter quite unperturbed by the fiscal 
risks involved
Graham Bishop thought there were 
two reasons why dependence on such 
ad hoc mutual support may now be 
more problematic. First, there was the 
sheer size of behemoths like the Royal 
Bank of Scotland which require lifelines 
for much longer than just 3-6 months. 
The BoE (2015b: 9) reports that the 
EU headquarters 14 out of 30 global 
systemically important banks, compared to 
only 8 in the U.S.; 4 of them are in the UK 
(HSBC, Barcleys, RBS, Standard Chartered).  
Partly for that reason, swaplines between 
central banks that used not to pose credit 
risks may now do so. One may add that 
under the institutional set-up of the 
Eurozone, the fiscal risks to member states 
could be much more worrying than in the 
U.S., triggering the doom loop between 
banks and sovereigns. Hence, the ECB may 
face resistance from member states if the 
liquidity support to the Bank of England 
leads to losses, especially after it had just 
cut its links with the EU.  
The other reason why dependence on 
mutual support was not a given lay 
in the new systemic risk presented by 
central counterparties (CCPs) for clearing, 
especially in derivatives trading. CCPs 
are increasingly important because of 
international regulation in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis (Domanski et al 2015). 
Nicolas Véron was adamant that this was 
a significant challenge of mutual concern: 
it is not clear whether CCPs are a Single 
Market or a Eurozone issue. The legal 
dispute over the question whether CCPs’ 
clearing derivatives of euro contracts can 
be located outside the Eurozone4 was in his 
view both an illustration of this uncertainty 
and also a great distraction from the 
common interest. “[T]here is a problem 
in CCPs that is entirely new, is entirely 
about derivatives, makes them much more 
important as a new category of players 
compared with the past, and therefore the 
past is not a guide to the future. I think 
the policy challenge has to be set out 
much more specifically. [..] The UK is not 
unique in having a big international CCP, 
there is also one in Germany, so we have 
two in the EU. But we have to think about 
what is a consistent regime.” Graham 
Bishop added to this that “a CCP non-bank 
resolution [..] was meant to come already 
but it hasn’t: it seems to be very difficult.” 
Graham Bishop was also unconvinced that 
the Court case settled the question of 
whether a central bank can ask for the  
CCP to be located in their area of 
supervisory jurisdiction if their business  
is in the currency the central bank issues.  
“[T]he UK sued [..] on the grounds that 
[the ECB] was talking about securities and 
the ECB’s statutes didn’t permit that, and 
4  Court case T-496/11  ended with a General Court ruling that “[annulled] the Eurosystem Oversight Policy 
Framework published by the ECB in so far as it sets a requirement for CCPs involved in the clearing of securities 
to be located within the eurozone”. As a consequence, the BoE and the ECB agreed on intensified information 
exchange as well as on formal swap arrangements (BoE 2015C). 
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the [European Court of Justice] said the UK 
was right on this very narrow question of 
whether it was outside the ECB’s powers. 
[..] [The ECB] are not being put off because 
the various global regulators talk about 
the national central bank, the supplier of 
the currency, to be in a position to know 
what is going on in its currency, which is 
perfectly reasonable.” 
CCP regulation is therefore one more of 
these rooms in which the UK may want to 
be. But it is not clear whether this would 
be greatly affected by the UK’s relationship 
to Europe as it is a matter of regulation 
stipulated by the G20. However, Sharon 
Bowles recalled a relevant EU-U.S. dispute 
in this context: “if you want to know 
whether the EU can get political about  
this you only have to look at us being 
unable to find equivalence with U.S.  
CCPs on an entirely political point. The EU 
got fed up with being pushed around and 
the snootiness of the U.S. over things [..].  
If [the EU is] capable of that with the U.S.,  
I wonder what the response would be 
if [the UK] left. They will try to get the 
maximum of our cake, our leverage has 
gone at that point.”  It seems likely that 
the ECB would not let the issue of CCP 
location rest if the UK leaves the EU, for 
more or less good reasons. 
4.2 Third country status for the City
The answer on what Brexit would mean 
for the City depends largely on the 
nature of third country status the UK 
might achieve. Simon Gleeson argued 
strongly that if banks and regulated firms 
would seek and get “a full set of third 
country equivalences, they can to some 
extent continue as normal. If they don’t, 
they have to establish subsidiaries in the 
Eurozone to do that business…. that needs 
passports that you won’t get. [..]  This is 
why all roads lead to Norway.” Either way, 
Brexit would not imply massive changes  
to the way financial services markets 
operate, unless “we have an outbreak  
of childishness and a sort of deliberate 
closing of the European borders. If that 
happens, it won’t just happen in finance.  
If that happens, it will be a major 
detriment to the UK economy, and it will 
have a major detrimental effect on the 
European economy that will in turn impose 
a further detriment to the UK economy. 
So either nothing happens or something 
happens which is far worse than just the 
impact on financial services.” 
But apart from this childishness scenario, 
Simon Gleeson was not too worried 
about the effects on the City as it has 
an “embedded architecture”: “There is 
no place that has an infrastructure even 
close to that which is in London.” Nicolas 
Véron agreed, with one qualification: 
“in most scenarios of separation, even 
in the most bitter, not much happens to 
the business of the City because the City 
has structures that others don’t have. [..] 
The complication arises in the next crisis. 
Central bank cooperation is 
of mutual interest but new 
systemic risks may make it  
more problematic.
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Because here is where systems are tested 
and this is very path dependent. So I don’t 
think you can have a simple answer to that 
question because it depends on the story 
of the separation and of the crisis itself.”
Others were more pessimistic as regards 
even normal times. The most concrete 
warning and prediction came from Tony 
Halmos: “There is absolutely no doubt that 
a considerable number of international 
firms currently based in London are 
considering their options. Some of them 
have already made decisions about new 
businesses which they have already 
decided not to put in London because of 
the uncertainty already around this issue. 
If we vote to stay in, this might change but 
not necessarily. An interesting example is 
that an international bank decided to put 
a stream of work in Warsaw rather than in 
London, solely because of the uncertainty 
about our membership of the EU: in the 
single market, not in the Eurozone. [..]
Some [international firms] are already 
going, some of them say they will go, and, 
this is only a guess, but of the 400.000 
financial jobs in London and the 1.000.000 
in the UK I think that about 150.000 in 
London and 350 – 400.000 of the million 
will go over ten years. They won’t go 
dramatically over one night, it will be bit 
by bit.”
The response of U.S. American banks 
would be crucial in Karel Lanoo’s view. 
This is first of all because U.S. banks are 
much “stronger” than UK and Continental 
European ones. And they use the UK as 
a gateway to the Eurozone. “American 
institutions know extremely well how 
important the regulatory environment 
is. The moment [the UK doesn’t] have 
full equivalence probably some of these 
businesses will shift back to the U.S.  
These institutions are enormous.  
And the moment the UK leaves, a lot of 
this business will move; which will affect 
the rest of the City.” From his Italian and 
banking background, Lorenzo Codogno 
supported this prediction: “Before 
monetary union, banks had to have local 
branches. With the monetary union many 
banks migrated [from Milan] to London 
based on a cost analysis. [..] [H]ow much 
would this imply in terms of migration, 
I don’t know but there will be some 
migration.” 
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On the basis of a more extensive analysis 
with the late Philip Whyte, John Springford 
came to a balanced but ultimately negative 
conclusion: “[T]he reason why we have 
seen such large investments is not only 
because of the EU. Obviously it is about the 
deep and liquid markets here, it’s about 
conglomeration effects more broadly, it’s 
about the labour market and the skills 
that we have, it’s about the legal regime, 
it’s about the time-zone and so forth. 
But the question is whether the sign of 
the effects of Brexit on the City would be 
positive or negative? It seemed pretty clear 
to us that it would be negative, because if 
you look at the third country regimes [..], 
then you see that essentially the ability 
of financial institutions to be able to sell 
to customers across borders [..] is quite 
tightly circumscribed.” They expect the EU 
to harden its stance: “They will be pretty 
insistent that quite a lot of cross-border 
activity would not be acceptable and that 
which was acceptable, they would insist  
on some pretty strict equivalence tests.”  
The conclusion seems to be, as Tony 
Halmos put it: “The honest supporters 
of Brexit say, well that’s fine but it’s not 
about that at the end of the day, it’s about 
the future standing of Britain. If people say 
that there won’t be any economic effects 
then they are living in a sort of lala-land.”
There were dissenting voices pointing out 
that “the City” is not as homogeneous 
as the label makes it sound, and 
hence the effects of Brexit should be 
differentiated. While it is difficult to find 
an exact breakdown for the City, the BoE 
Quarterly Bulletin (Burgess 2011, p. 236, 
Table B) shows that in 2010, banks and 
building societies had a share of 57% 
in UK financial services, other financial 
intermediaries had 9%, insurers and 
pension funds 19%, and auxiliary services 
15%. This lends some support to the 
distinction between financial services and 
business services. Business services are 
much bigger than financial services.  
The UK is very competitive in the latter  
and has a massive surplus. The effect 
would therefore depend on whether 
business services  are so tied in with 
banking services.
Raoul Ruparel generalized this point, 
namely that “the City [..] is not 
homogenous”. He did not deny that 
“the large international institutions that 
are a predominant part of the City will 
be seriously affected but we also have 
to accept that other parts of the City, 
asset managers in particular, smaller and 
medium sized, don’t recognize the same 
benefits from the Single Market. And 
the passport for them doesn’t work as 
well.” They might even benefit from more 
flexibility in regulation. In his view, this 
is one of the reasons why a lot of hedge 
funds advocate Brexit, the other being 
their “particular political persuasion”. 
Similarly “[o]n the broader professional 
services side, the internal market is not 
particularly complete and it doesn’t work 
particularly well [..], so the opportunity 
costs for the broader services are lower.” 
These changes would not spell the end of 
London as a financial centre. “There are 
many ways of being a financial centre. “
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The UK financial system is different, 
given its enormous size, the significant 
role specific sectors in it play, and given 
the interconnectedness of the City. 
Whether these differences matter for 
financial regulation of banks, capital 
and insurance markets has been quite 
controversial among the participants. 
Handling third country regimes seems the 
only issue where all saw the UK to have 
a fundamentally different position, both 
now and in a potential future outside  
the EU.
This singular difference suggests there 
are no easy wins for renegotiation in this 
area. The paradox of the City’s weakness 
of strength, noted by John Springford also 
contributes to this: the City is the most 
important European financial centre and 
these strong business interests weaken its 
bargaining position. Sharon Bowles did 
not even believe that the UK is seeking 
so-called safeguards in respect of financial 
markets “other than the wider general 
check on merits, subsidiarity and reduction 
of legislation”. One may of course see 
these general checks somewhat ignored in 
the present frenzy of building a banking 
union, and Raoul Ruparel certainly was 
of this view. But what may help are some 
moves in the EU, namely “a more capital 
market friendly environment through the 
capital market union and together with 
increasing international coordination 
of market regulation,” to quote Sharon 
Bowles again. Another issue, forcefully 
argued by Nicolas Véron and Graham 
Bishop, is the regulation-driven rise of 
central counterparties.  
They should be an obvious cause for 
common concern, especially after the  
Court ruling strengthened the UK’s 
position (see footnote 4).  
The position of David Cameron’s 
administration seems to reflect this weak 
case for major negotiations in this area. 
This is, as Tony Halmos reminded us, a 
far cry from the situation in 2011, when 
David Cameron tried to use his leverage 
in the negotiations on the fiscal compact 
to extract concessions from other member 
states. “There was coincidentally a meeting 
of senior people from across the City. 
The crucial point was that because [the 
list of demands] was created without any 
consultation and was all written from 
the point of view of excluding Britain, 
basically the City was up in arms about 
it. And it was presented by the media 
as ‘we are saving the City,’ to which the 
first reaction was ‘well if we want to be 
saved we will go to St Pauls and pray 
and nobody asked us if we wanted to 
be saved.’” It is the government that has 
changed its position: “The way it is now 
being presented is obviously a hundred 
miles away from that, and it is absolutely 
spot on to do it as formulated in the Dear 
Donald letter. That’s the way to handle it. 
There are Eurozone-outs, we are not the 
only one, and that is the right way to put 
it. The chances of success for this to work 
are rather high.” This optimistic conclusion 
may not be shared by all participants but 
it is a fair summary of the deliberations to 
see the Eurozone outsider status of the UK 
as a challenge but not as an obstacle to EU 
membership.
5. Conclusions
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